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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND COMPENSATION IN THE UK 
Dr Richard Goldberg* 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is timely to be writing a paper on medical malpractice and compensation in the UK. As we 
shall see, several issues are currently commanding attention in England and Wales and in 
Scotland. Indeed, it is fair to say that at no time in recent years has the future of clinical 
negligence litigation in the UK been as uncertain as it is now.  
In the first part of this paper, I examine the context in which medical malpractice 
liability is operating in the UK. We will see that the fact that the state- run National Health 
Service is the major health care provider has several implications, since funding for medical 
malpractice compensation in the NHS comes from the taxpayer. For several years, the civil 
justice system has been failing to meet the needs of litigants in clinical negligence claims, and 
I examine the commissioned reports that have attempted to address these problems.  
I go on to examine the most recent empirical evidence on the incidence and funding 
of claims in England and Scotland, to show a trend of expenditure on clinical negligence 
increasing, particularly  in England. A statutory framework for the empowerment of some of 
the Chief Medical Officer’s recommendations in his report, Making Amends is present in the 
NHS Redress Act 2006, and this is briefly assessed. In Scotland, while medical negligence 
remains the primary route to bringing a claim for compensation for medical injury, no-fault 
compensation is now the favoured way forward of the Scottish Government for the NHS in 
Scotland. A No Fault Compensation Review Group has just reported and I examine its 
recommendations, which provide a radical development in the field of compensation for 
medical malpractice. 
The heart of the paper examines the existing basis of medical liability, with particular 
emphasis on the problems in establishing negligence and factual causation. Finally, I examine 
in the context of clinical negligence claims both the recommendations for reforming the costs 
of civil litigation in England and Wales and the dramatic changes being introduced to the 
Legal Aid system, in particular the abolition of legal aid for clinical negligence cases. 
 
2. The Context of Medical Malpractice Liability 
By far the majority of the healthcare provision in the United Kingdom (UK) is under the 
National Health Service (NHS). Since its establishment in 1948 by the then Labour Atlee 
Government, it has grown to become the world’s largest publicly funded health service. With 
the exception of charges for some prescriptions and optical and dental services, the NHS 
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continues to remain free at the point of use for anyone resident in the UK. While funded 
centrally from national taxation, NHS services in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales are managed separately.1 There is some private sector health care, which the 
Conservative part of the coalition government is keen to expand over the next few years, but 
the NHS continues to be the primary health care provider in Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland.   
This has major consequences in that when compensation and legal costs are payable 
as a result of medical malpractice in the NHS, this money comes from the taxpayer. Indeed, 
in England this money comes out of the Department of Health’s own budget. In an era of 
increasing austerity in public service provision in the UK, there is great concern as to the 
increasing costs to the public purse of clinical negligence claims. This concern had been 
present for several years before the recent world financial crisis,2 but now, more than ever 
before, it has become the dominant issue in clinical negligence litigation.  
In his review of the Civil Justice System in 1996, Lord Woolf singled out medical 
negligence for the most intensive examination because it was in that area that the civil justice 
system was failing most conspicuously to meet the needs of litigants.3 Lord Woolf 
emphasised five major problems with the system, viz.: (a) the excessive disproportion 
between costs and damages in medical negligence, especially in lower value cases; (b) the 
often unacceptable delay in resolving claims; (c) the overly long pursuit of unmeritorious 
claims and the defence of clear –cut claims; (d) the lower success rate than in other personal 
injury litigation; and (e) the  greater suspicion and lack of cooperation between the parties 
than in many other areas of litigation.4 The resulting revision of the Civil Procedure Rules 
contained several measures to improve the litigation process in medical negligence cases, 
though whether this has resulted in a significant reduction of costs remains to be seen.5 The 
weaknesses of the current system of providing compensation to those suffering harm arising 
                                                                 
* Reader in Law, School of Law, University of Aberdeen, UK. I wish to thank Professor Sheila McLean, 
University of Glasgow, for helpful initial discussions.  
1
 See http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/overview.aspx, last accessed on 29 November 2010. 
 
2
 See, generally, the Chief Medical Officer’s Report,  Department of Health, Making Amends: A Consultation 
Paper Setting Out Proposals for Reforming the Approach to Clinical Negligence (London: Department of 
Health, 2003). 
3
 Rt. Hon. Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London, The Stationary Office, 1996), Ch 15, para 1-2.  
4
 Ibid, para 2. 
5
 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 SI No. 3132 (CPR); M. Jones, Medical Negligence (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
4
th
 ed, 2008), para 1-028.  See, especially, CPR Pt 35 (Experts and Assessors).  Note the overriding objective of 
the Civil Procedure Rules, which is to deal with cases justly, having regard to, inter a lia, saving expense, dealing 
with the case in ways that are proportionate to the amount of money involved, the importance of the case, the 
complexity of the issues and the financial position of each party: CPR r.1.1.   
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out of medical care were highlighted as needing urgent review by Sir Ian Kennedy in the 
Final Report of the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry.6 Indeed, the Report went further in 
recommending the abolition of the clinical negligence system, and its replacement by “an 
alternative system for compensating those patients who suffer harm arising out of treatment 
from the NHS”.7 
 
In response to such calls for reform, the Department of Health initiated a review of the 
system of handling claims for compensation and complaints, which resulted in a report by the 
Chief Medical Officer in 2003.8 While rejecting a wide-ranging no-fault scheme for all types 
of injury, primarily on the grounds of costs and the practicalities in framing it,  9  the Chief 
Medical Officer in his report, Making Amends, proposed “a composite package of reform”,10 
which would apply to England only, and which involved a new system of providing redress 
for patients harmed “as a result of seriously substandard NHS hospital care” (The NHS 
Redress Scheme).11  
There would be four main elements to these arrangements, viz: (1) an investigation of 
the incident which is alleged to have caused harm and the resulting harm; (2) provision of an 
explanation to the patient of what happened and why, and of the action proposed to prevent 
repetition; (3) the development and delivery of a package of care, providing remedial 
treatment, therapy, or continuing care, as where necessary; and (4), payments for pain and 
suffering, out of pocket expenses and the costs of care or treatment, which the NHS could not 
provide.12 The NHS Redress Scheme would also encompass a care and compensation 
package for seriously neurologically impaired babies, including those with cerebral palsy, 
where the impairment was related to or resulted from the birth.13 The overall goal of these 
proposed reforms was that they would be “fair both to individual patients and meet their 
                                                                 
6
 Learning from Bristol: The Report of the Public Inquiry into Children’s Heart Surgery at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary CM 5207 (I) (July 2001), recommendation 37.  
 
7
 Ibid, recommendation 119.  
8
 Department of Health, Making Amends: A Consultation Paper Setting Out Proposals for Reforming the  
Approach to Clinical Negligence in the NHS  (June 2003). 
9
 Ibid, Ch 7, p. 113, para 15. 
10
 Ibid, Ch 7, p.115, para 22. 
11
 Ibid, Ch 8, p119, para 10, recommendation 1. 
12
 Ibid, Ch 8, p119, para 10, recommendation 1. 
13
 Ibid, Ch 8, pp120-121, para 10, recommendation 2. 
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needs as well as making care safer for all NHS patients”.14 This has been subject to criticism, 
in that it has been pointed out that it is far from obvious that the litigation system needs to be 
changed “in order to make health care safer”.15  
3. Recent Empirical Evidence on the Numbers and Funding of Claims.  
(a) England  
In England, the principal statistics are now published in the Annual Report and Accounts of 
the authority which indemnifies English NHS bodies against claims for clinical negligence, 
viz. the National Health Service Litigation Authority (NHSLA).16  The numbers of claims 
made on an annual basis has been largely static, although the latest figures from the 
NHSLA’s Annual Report and Accounts 2010 have seen an increase in claim numbers; 
expenditure on clinical negligence continues to increase. 
 
 
                                                                 
14
  Ibid, Ch 8, pp117-118, para 4. 
15
 M. Jones, Medical Negligence (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 4
th
 ed, 2008), p49. While, “[t]here is no evidence 
that the litigation process makes health less safe there is plenty of evidence that the less safe health care is, the 
more litigation there will be”: ibid, p49.   
16
 The NHSLA was established in November 1995 (see the National Health Service Litigation Authority 
(Establishment and Constitution) Order SI 1995/2800, as amended by SI’s 2002/2621, 2005/503 and 
2005/1445) to indemnify English NHS bodies against clinical negligence: see NHSLA Factsheet 1: background 
information, http://www.nhlsa.com . 
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.  
Graph 1. Number of claims received by NHSLA. 
Source: NHSLA Annual Report and Accounts, 2010, p13; © Crown Copyright 2010.  
As we can see from Graph 1, the number of clinical negligence claims reported to the 
NHSLA in 2009/10 was 6,652, which represents a 10% increase over 2008/9 (6,088) which, 
in turn, recorded an 11% increase over 2007/08 (5,470).17 While the NHSLA have described 
these figures as a matter for concern, there has been previously three years of relative stability 
in claim numbers.18 The NHSLA have examined the reasons for the growth in volume of 
claims, and remain convinced that a major factor is the availability of the “ ‘so-called’ no win 
no fee market”,19 which enables claimants to litigate without financial risk, and which proves 
very lucrative for claimant solicitors.20 It is submitted that, when viewed in the context of the 
                                                                 
17
 The National Health Service Litigation Authority: Report and Accounts 2010  (London, The Stationary Office, 
2010), Chief Executive’s report, p7; Claims received, p13. Since submission of this paper, the NHSLA Report 
and Accounts 2010-2011 have now been published. The number of clinical negligence claims reported to the 
NHSLA in 2010/11 was 8,655, which represents a 30% increase over 2009/10 (6,652). The NHSLA suggests 
that the significant increase in claims may be explained by the requirement for claims to now send the NHSLA a 
copy of the Letter of Claim at the same time as it is sent to the defendant NHS body, at which point they now 
record the claim. They are analysing patterns and trends to obtain a better understanding behind the increase:  
The National Health Service Litigation Authority: Report and Accounts 201 0-2011 (London, The Stationary 
Office, 2011), Claims Received, pp12-13. 
18
 Ibid, p7. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid.  
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previous three years of relative stability, the increase in claim numbers during the last two 
years should not give rise to the degree of concern that appears to have emanated from the 
NHSLA.  In this context, it should be remembered that it is difficult to identify reliable, 
definitive,  evidence concerning  the number of medical errors  and claims occurring as a 
whole, and great care must be used when attempting to draw conclusions from the figures 
available.21   
However, it is fair to say that the overall legal costs are rising. The authority’s 
expenditure on clinical negligence claims has continued to rise over the last two years. Graph 
2 shows that the figures have risen from £633,325,000 in 2007/08 to £769,226,000 in 2008/9, 
to £786,991,000 in 2009/10.22  
 
 
Graph 2. Payments made in clinical claims 
Source: NHSLA Annual Report and Accounts, 2010, p15; © Crown Copyright 2010. 
 
                                                                 
21
 V. Harpwood, Medicine, Malpractice and Misapprehensions (Oxford: Routledge Cavendish, 2007), p46. 
22
 The National Health Service Litigation Authority: Report and Accounts 20 10 (London, The Stationary Office, 
2010), p.15. Since submission of this paper, the NHSLA Report and Accounts 2010-2011 have now been 
published. The legal costs figure has risen to £863,400,000 in 2010/11:  The National Health Service Litigation 
Authority: Report and Accounts 2010-2011 (London, The Stationary Office, 2011), p14. 
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As at 31 March 2010, the provisions for periodical payments (i.e. damage settlements which 
include payments made on a regular basis, usually throughout the claimant’s life, in place of 
the traditional single lump sum) now total £1.88 billion.23  
(b) Scotland 
In Scotland, the NHS Health Boards currently fund all settlements of clinical negligence 
claims, but receive additional protection from disproportionate losses through participation in 
the Clinical Negligence and Other Risks Indemnity Scheme (CNORIS), a risk-sharing 
scheme whose membership is mandatory for all NHSScotland healthcare bodies.24 The 
Central Legal Office of NHSScotland defends claims on behalf of the NHS Boards. While 
claims rose during the 1990s, there has been a declining trend since 1999.25   In 2008/9, the 
number of potential clinical negligence claims notified to Health Boards was 362 (342 
medical and dental and 20 nursing).26 During 2008/9, 171 claims were settled with £26, 007, 
747 paid out in settlements,27 with adverse legal costs amounting to £2.5 million.28 While the 
number of settled claims from 1989-2009 has only increased slightly, in respect of the total 
awards and costs of settled claims from 1989-2009, the average sum awarded has risen 
significantly over that period. In addition, for claims with awards below £20,000, during the 
                                                                 
23
 Since submission of this paper, the NHSLA Report and Accounts 2010-11 have now been published. As at 31 
March 2011, the provisions for periodical payments totalled £2.41 billion:  The National Health Service 
Litigation Authority: Report and Accounts 2010-2011 (London, The Stationary Office, 2011), p16. 
 
24
 See A-M Farrell, S. Devaney and A Dar, No Fault Compensation Schemes for Medical Injury: A Review  
(Scottish Government Social Research, 2010), para 1.2. In 2008/9, the NHS Boards contributed £27 million to 
CNORIS: Nicola Sturgeon MSP, Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Health and Wellbeing, 
Scottish Parliament Written Answers, S3W-32002, Thursday 11 March 2010, available at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/Apps2/Business/PQA/Default.aspx, last accessed on 29 September 2011. 
 .  
25
 No Fault Compensation Review Group, Report and Recommendations: Vol. 1, 15 February 2011, para 2.16, 
available at: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/NHS-Scotland/No-faultCompensation/NFCGReport. 
 
26
 A-M Farrell, S. Devaney and A Dar, No Fault Compensation Schemes for Medical Injury: A Review  (Scottish 
Government Social Research, 2010), para 1.2. 
27
, Nicola Sturgeon MSP, Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Health and Wellbeing, Scottish 
Parliament Written Answers, S3W-30597, Monday 25 January 2010, available at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/Apps2/Business/PQA/Default.aspx,  last accessed on 29 September 2011. 
 
28
 A-M Farrell, S. Devaney and A Dar, No Fault Compensation Schemes for Medical Injury: A Review  (Scottish 
Government Social Research, 2010), para 1.2. 
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period 1998-2009, the costs have been rising and currently can be greater than the awards 
made. In addition, significant costs are incurred for unsettled claims: during the period of 
1998-2009 the costs rose from around £300,000 to over £1million.29    
(c) Summary 
While the numbers and expenditure in Scotland is dwarfed by England, this is unsurprising 
bearing in mind that Scotland has a population of 5 million, and England 50 million. It is 
clear, however, that in Scotland, while the number of claims is in fact declining, claim costs 
are increasing, especially for claims with awards below £20,000 and also costs for unsettled 
claims.  There are therefore concerns about the increase in the cost of claims in both England 
and Scotland.  However, the number of claims in England remains relatively static, other than 
the increases in the last two years, and the number of claims in Scotland is actually declining.  
 
4. NHS Redress Act 2006 
A statutory framework for the empowerment of some of the Chief Medical Officer’s 
recommendations in Making Amends is present in the NHS Redress Act 2006. It provides for 
the establishment by regulations of a scheme of NHS Redress. The Act creates a statutory 
framework to empower the Secretary of State to create by Regulations a scheme to enable 
“redress to be provided without recourse to civil proceedings”.30 These Regulations have still 
to be issued.  
The NHS Redress Scheme will apply where a “qualifying liability in tort” arises in 
connection with the provision, as part of the health service in England, of qualifying services 
by: (a) the Secretary of State; (b) a Primary Care Trust; (c) a designated Strategic Health 
Authority; and (d) a body or other person providing services whose provision is the subject of 
arrangements with the Secretary of State, a Primary Care Trust or designated Strategic Health 
Authority. A “qualifying liability in tort” is defined as liability in tort owed:  
“(a) in respect of or consequent upon personal injury or loss arising out of or in 
connection with breach of a duty of care owed to any person in connection with the 
diagnosis of illness or the care or treatment of any patient, and  
(b) in consequence of any act or omission by a health care professional”.31 
It is clear therefore that the liability under the scheme is fault-based and is not no fault 
compensation.32   
                                                                 
29
 No Fault Compensation Review Group, Report and Recommendations: Vol. 1 , 15 February 2011, paras. 2.19-
2.25 
30
 NHS Redress Act 2006, s.1(1).  
31
 NHS Redress Act 2006, s.1(4). 
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The NHS Redress Scheme does not apply to liability which has been the subject of 
civil proceedings.33 It applies to services provided in a hospital (in England or elsewhere), but 
the Secretary of State can extend the scheme by regulations.34 However, the Scheme is 
inapplicable to primary dental services, primary medical services, general ophthalmic 
services and pharmaceutical services.35 While the claimant’s right to bring civil proceedings 
is not removed, civil proceedings and the NHS Redress Scheme will be mutually exclusive. 
Accordingly, the Act establishes that the Redress Scheme must provide for a settlement 
agreement under the scheme to include a waiver of the right to bring civil proceedings in 
respect of the liability to which the settlement relates.36 Conversely, the Scheme must also 
provide for the termination of its proceedings if the liability to which they relate becomes the 
subject of civil proceedings.37  
Since the Regulations have still to be issued, it remains to be seen how the Act will 
operate in practice. It has been said that since it is intended that the scheme be overseen by 
the NHSLA,38 there may be a potential conflict of interest on the NHSLA of being a judge 
and jury in its own cause.39 The proposed scheme has been further criticised on several 
grounds. It has been submitted that, while it is likely to provide nominally greater access to 
justice for low value claims, it is unlikely overall to result in greater access to justice for 
injured patients, especially given its fault-based eligibility criteria; it lacks sufficient 
independence from the NHS in terms of its investigation procedures; and that it fails to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
32
 M. Jones, Medical Negligence (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 4
th
 ed, 2008), p.57. Cf, per contra J. K. Mason, 
and G. T. Laurie,  Mason and McColl Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (8th ed) (OUP, 2010), p128 (sed quaere). 
33
 NHS Redress Act 2006, s.2(2). 
 
34
 NHS Redress Act 2006, s.1(5). 
 
35
 NHS Redress Act 2006, s.1(6). 
 
36
 NHS Redress Act 2006, s.6(5). 
 
37
 NHS Redress Act 2006, s.6(6). 
 
38
 NHS Redress Act 2006, s.11(1). 
 
39
 J. K. Mason, and G. T. Laurie, Mason and McColl Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (8th ed) (OUP, 2010), 
p128. 
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provide for the accountability of healthcare professionals.40 While the scheme has yet to be 
implemented in England, a Welsh version of the scheme is being introduced in 2011.41  
5. Patients’ Rights Bill in Scotland: the No Fault Compensation Review Group Report 
(McLean Report) 
The NHS Redress Act does not apply to Scotland. However, extensive consultation on the 
possible content of a Patients’ Rights Bill42 indicated that no-fault compensation was the 
favoured way forward of the Scottish Government for the NHS in Scotland.43 The 
Consultation Paper stressed the “need for further work on the practical implications and 
potential costs of a change in compensation arrangements” before making any firm decision 
on future arrangements.44  The Scottish Government announced in August 2009 the creation 
of a short-life working group, the No Fault Compensation Review Group, chaired by 
Professor Sheila McLean,45 in order to progress this work. 
The Group’s remit was to consider the potential benefits for patients in Scotland of  
no-fault compensation and whether such a scheme could be introduced alongside the existing 
clinical negligence arrangements, taking account of (i) the cost implications; (ii) the 
consequences for healthcare staff, and the quality and safety of care; (iii) the wider 
implications for the system of justice and personal injury liability; and (iv) the evidence on 
how no fault compensation has operated in other countries. The Group was also charged with 
making recommendations on the key principals and design criteria that could be adopted for a 
no fault compensation scheme.46   
The Group reported in February 2011,47 concluding that the current system for 
dealing with claims in relation to injuries sustained during NHS treatment is not meeting the 
needs of patients, and potentially creates an atmosphere of tension between patients and their 
                                                                 
40
 A.-M. Farrell and S. Devaney, ‘Making Amends or making things worse? Clinical Negligence Reform and 
Patient Redress in England’ (2007) 27 Legal Studies 630-648; No Fault Compensation Review Group, Report 
and Recommendations: Vol. 1, 15 February 2011, para 2.32. 
41
 No Fault Compensation Review Group, Report and Recommendations: Vol. 1 , 15 February 2011, paras 2.32,  
2.37-2.41.  
42
 See Patients’ Rights: A Public Consultation on a Patients’ Rights Bill for Users of the NHS in Scotland 
(Healthcare Policy and Strategy Diretorate, Scottish Government, September 2008). 
43
 Ibid, para 69. 
44
 Ibid, para 69 
45
 International Bar Association Professor of Law and Ethics  in Medicine in the University of  Glasgow. 
46
 No-fault Compensation Review, MRG, Paper 1. 
47
 No Fault Compensation Review Group, Report and Recommendations: Vol. 1 , 15 February 2011, available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/NHS-Scotland/No-faultCompensation/NFCGReport. 
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health care providers. In addition, the widely accepted view that patients are more interested 
in a meaningful apology, an explanation and assurances about future practices was reinforced 
by the empirical research undertaken and part of the review.48     The group explored several 
well-established no fault schemes in other jurisdictions, in particular the New Zealand and 
Swedish models.49 The report recommended that consideration should be given to the 
establishment of a no fault compensation scheme for medical injury, along the lines of the 
Swedish model.50 While the proposed new system would remove the need to prove 
negligence, it would still require proof that harm was caused by treatment. The thorny issue 
of causation is therefore not eliminated by the proposed system. Although the Swedish model 
provided the basis for the no fault system, the Group’s view on eligibility for compensation 
was that it should not be based on the so-called ‘avoidability’ test as used in Sweden (i.e. that 
patients are eligible to receive compensation if they have suffered injury that could have been 
avoided), but rather a clear description of which injuries are not eligible for compensation.51    
The McLean report recommended that the no fault scheme should cover all medical 
treatment injuries that occur in Scotland. Such injuries could be caused by, for instance, the 
treatment itself, failure to treat, as well as faulty equipment, in which case there would be 
third party liability.52 It was considered that the scheme should extend to all registered 
healthcare professionals in Scotland, and not simply to those employed by NHSScotland.53 
Claimants who fail under the no fault scheme should retain the right to litigate, based on an 
improved litigation system.54 Should a claimant be successful under the no fault scheme, any 
financial award made should be deducted from any subsequent award made as a result of 
litigation.55 Appeal from the adjudication of the no fault scheme should be available to a 
court of law on point of law or fact.56  
The group has suggested that more patients could have claims resolved under such a 
system than currently achieve resolution through the courts, and that the proposed scheme 
will not lead to expenditure greatly above that which the NHS currently pays in compensation 
                                                                 
48
 Ibid, para 7.1. 
49
 Ibid, para 7.6.  
50
 Ibid, para 7.11, Recommendation 1.  
51
 Ibid, Recommendation 2. 
52
 Ibid, Recommendation 3. 
 
53
 Ibid, Recommendation 4. 
54
 Ibid, Recommendation 7. 
55
 Ibid, Recommendation 8. 
56
 Ibid, Recommendation 9. 
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and legal fees.57 Its research team provided a paper which assumes a 20% increase in claims 
under the proposed scheme and that 40% of the claims which fall under the litigation system 
would receive an award under the proposed no fault scheme. It also assumes that such 
additional claims will be low value claims. However, the report concedes that further analysis 
may be required to test the availability of these assumptions.58   
In welcoming the recommendations, the Scottish Government has proposed to 
investigate thoroughly how such a scheme would work in practice, and it will undertake a 
further analysis of the cost implications.59 
 
6. Basis of Liability for Medical Injury 
(a) Contract, Tort and Delict60 
Most claims for compensation for medical malpractice are brought in tort (England) and 
delict (in Scotland), the overwhelming majority of which are for the tort/delict of negligence.  
A contractual relationship does not subsist between an NHS doctor and patient within 
the NHS.61  However, in the Scottish Sheriff Court decision of Dow v. Tayside University 
Hospitals NHS Trust,62 it was held that it could be possible under Scots law (without the 
requirement of consideration in the formation of a contract) for a doctor providing treatment 
under the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978, to enter into a contractual 
relationship with an NHS patient, but only where it was clear that the doctor concerned was 
exceptionally entering into a contract and was not relying on the statutory relationship 
alone.63 Such an additional contract would require to be expressed in clear terms and would 
                                                                 
57
 Ibid, para 7.4 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 No Fault Compensation Review Group Report-Scottish Government Response, (Edinburgh, Scottish 
Government, 2011)  available at:  http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Health/NHS-Scotland/No-
faultCompensation/NFCSGResponse. 
60
 See, generally, M. Jones, Medical Negligence (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), Ch 2; R. Mulheron, Ch 3, 
‘Duties in Contract and Tort’ in A Grubb, J McHale and J Lang (eds), Principles of Medical Law (3rd ed) 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), 
61
 Reynolds  v. The Health First Medical Group  [2000] Lloyds’s Rep Med 240, Hitchin County Court 
(arrangement between doctor and patient in NHS based on statutory obligation rather than contract); applying 
Pfizer Corpn. v. Ministry of Health [1965] A.C. 512, 535-6, per Lord Reid (provision of medicinal product by a 
pharmacist to a patient under an NHS prescription not a sale, as no contract between patien t and pharmacist; 
pharmacist is under a statutory obligation to supply the product to the patient on the presentation of the 
prescription and the correct prescription charge). 
62
 2006 SLT (Sh Ct) 141. 
63
 Ibid, [19]. 
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need to demonstrate an intention to add an additional liability on the part of the doctor, 
corresponding with the requirements of a unilateral promise.64  
However, if the patient/doctor relationship is a private one rather than one under the 
NHS, there will be a contractual relationship and it will be possible to bring an action for 
damages in contact. 
 
 
(b) The Requirements of Negligence  
In respect of negligence, a person seeking compensation for clinical negligence must 
establish 3 things, viz. (1) that the defendant owed the patient a duty of care; (2) that the 
defendant was in breach of that duty; and (3) that the breach of duty of care caused harm to 
the patient.  
 
(c) Duty of Care65 
A duty of care owed by a doctor to his patient has long existed in English and Scots law. 
Such a duty predates the seminal decision of Donoghue v Stevenson,66 and Lord Atkin’s 
celebrated ‘neighbour principle’ requiring the exercise of reasonable care towards all who are 
foreseeably likely to be injured in person or property by one’s acts or omissions.67 The 
relationship between doctor and patient also satisfies the so-called tripartite test of Caparo v 
Dickman,68 that requires not only that the loss to the claimant be reasonably foreseeable, but 
also that there be a close degree of proximity between the parties, and that it is “fair just and 
reasonable” to impose a duty of care. 
While establishing a duty of care in clinical negligence owed to the patient is not 
generally problematic, what is problematic is the establishment of the other two requirements, 
viz., that the doctor was in breach of his duty of care to the patient and that this breach of 
duty of care caused the patient harm. It is to the first of these two requirements that we now 
turn. 
                                                                 
64
 Ibid, [20]. 
65
 See, generally, R. Mulheron, Ch 3, ‘Duties in Contract and Tort’ in A Grubb, J McHale and J Lang (eds), 
Principles of Medical Law (3
rd
 ed) (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
66
 [1932] A.C. 562. 
67
 Ibid, 580. 
68
 [1990] 2 A.C. 605, at 616-618, per Lord Bridge, at 628, per Lord Roskill and at 633-634, per Lord Oliver. 
14 
 
(d) Standard of Care69 
In order to establish that the defendant was negligent, the claimant must show that the 
defendant fell below the required standard of care. The standard of care demanded of the 
doctor is the standard of the reasonably skilled and experienced doctor. In Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee,70 McNair J. directed the jury: 
The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have 
that special skill. A man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is a well-
established law that it sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary 
competent man exercising that particular art. 
In what became known as the Bolam test, he said:71  
[A doctor] is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular 
art…merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view. 
So where medical opinion is divided, Bolam establishes that a doctor is not negligent 
merely because he adheres to one body of opinion rather than another. This was confirmed by 
the House of Lords in Maynard v. West Midlands Area Health Authority.72 The House of 
Lords in Maynard and also in Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal 
Hospital73 were subject to relentless criticism by academics in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
including Kenendy and Grubb, for elevating “to the status of an unquestionable proposition 
of law derived from Bolam”74 that professional practice would not be reviewed by the courts. 
However, over the last twenty years, we have seen an increasing inclination of the 
courts to question the conduct of physicians, and also to challenge the credibility of medical 
experts and even, on rare occasions, to override clinical judgment.75 This pattern culminated 
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in the decision of the House of Lords in Bolitho v. City and Hackney HA,76 which was 
heralded two years later as spawning “a velvet revolution”77 in assessing reasonable care in 
medical negligence. In Bolitho, the House of Lords held that in applying the Bolam test, as 
opposed to merely accepting a body of opinion, the court had to be satisfied that exponents of 
the body of opinion relied upon could demonstrate that such an opinion had a “logical basis”, 
and that this assessment would need to be carried out on a risk-benefit basis.78 However, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson, delivering the opinion of the House of Lords, qualified his position in 
emphasising that “it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the conclusion that views 
genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable”.79 Accordingly, it has been 
held that if each body of medical opinion is capable of withstanding logical analysis, “there is 
no basis for a finding of negligence against the doctor in chosing one rather than the other”.80 
Bolitho has therefore been said to “devalue the trump card which Bolam presented to the 
medical profession, but only in limited circumstances”.81  
Post- Bolitho, the Court of Appeal has proceeded to weigh risks and benefits to 
determine whether an expert’s opinion had a ‘logical basis’ in Marriott v. West Midlands 
HA,82 and in Penney, Palmer and Cannon v. East Kent HA,83 and the High Court has done so 
in a disclosure of information decision.84 However, the Court of Appeal has sometimes failed 
to provide sufficient scrutiny of expert evidence in this way. A prime example is the decision 
of Vadera v. Shaw,85 where it has been submitted that insufficient judicial scrutiny was made 
of the evidence of a GP and her experts in deciding that her administration of a contraceptive 
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pill to a 22 year old Asian patient with a high blood pressure reading of 150/100 was not 
negligent.86  
(e) Causation87 
Merely to show that a defendant was in breach of a duty owed to the claimant and that the 
claimant suffered damage does not suffice to ground an action in negligence. The defendant’s 
breach must have caused the claimant’s damage and, additionally, the damage must be such 
that the law regards it proper to hold the defendant responsible for it. These two requirements 
jointly constitute causation and are often separately referred to as (i) cause in fact and (ii) 
cause in law and remoteness, although discussion will be confined in this paper to cause in 
fact. 
(i) Difficulties in proving causation in clinical negligence cases 
It is fair to say that causation in the context of medical law is fraught with difficulty.88 
Such difficulty is due both to the complexity of the factual circumstances themselves and to 
the (perhaps unnecessarily) complex nature of the law, when the principles come to be 
applied to the facts. As for the former, the complex and, to some extent, indeterminate nature 
of medical science means that the causal nexus between A and B, while suspected, may be 
hard to demonstrate. Indeed, it could be said that the more medicine is portrayed as a 
scientific endeavour, rather than as an art or a combination of both art and science, the harder 
it becomes on occasion to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the law a causative link between 
breach and damage.89 
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(ii) The burden of proof 
In the area of clinical negligence, as in all other aspects of civil litigation, the burden of proof 
is on the claimant who must prove causation and it must be established on a balance of 
probabilities.90 
(iii)The ‘but for’ test 
The standard approach to causation in the law of tort or delict is represented by the ‘but for’ 
test: that the damage suffered by the claimant would not have been suffered but for the 
defendant’s breach of duty. The assumption of the law is that it is possible to show (and, 
therefore, that the law should demand demonstration) that A would not have happened but for 
B. The corollary of that assumption is that if the ‘but for test cannot be satisfied, causation is 
not proved and the defendant, irrespective of any breach of duty, is not liable. While 
represented as a principle concerned with fact, it is, of course, self-evident that what is 
involved is a matter of policy. A limit is placed on the potential liability of the defendant by 
demanding that a particular form of causal nexus be shown. There are numerous 
circumstances, particularly in medical law, when this policy defeats the claim of the claimant. 
The clearest example is when the defendant’s breach of duty may have been part of the 
background leading to the claimant’s injury. If the defendant can demonstrate that the injury 
would have occurred in any event, regardless of any breach of duty, then the claimant’s 
action will fail. A classic example of this is Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital 
Management Committee.91 In that case, the plaintiff drank some tea, which contained arsenic 
and had been taken to the defendants’ casualty department. Although the defendants were 
held negligent in failing to treat him, it was held that this refusal to treat was not a cause of 
the deceased’s death since the nature of the arsenic introduced into his tea was such that he 
would have died in any event. 
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(iv) Cumulative causation 
Difficulties of proving causation appear to have been reduced by the ‘but-for’ test being 
modified so as to make it easier for the claimant to prove that the defendant’s negligence 
caused his injury or damage.  Where the factors are cumulative, the court, following the 
decision of the House of Lords in Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw92 has the option to find the 
defendant liable. If the factors taken together led to the claimant’s injury, then the defendant’s 
breach, as a contributing factor, may be held to have made a contribution which can be 
described as material, if it is not de minimis.93 
 
    (v) Material increase in risk 
If the claimant can establish that the defendant’s negligence contributed to the risk of 
damage, he may be able to recover.  In McGhee v National Coal Board,94 the House of Lords 
was prepared to infer that the failure to provide showers materially increased the risk  of 
contracting dermatitis from the brick dust and that in itself established a causal link with the 
defendant’s fault.95 The reason for doing so was the lack of available evidence, such that the 
claimant could not meet the ‘but for’ test and establish that the breach had caused or made a 
material contribution to the injury. 
 
 
(vi)Alternative causation 
By contrast, where the injury could have been caused by any one of a number of distinct 
factors, the material contribution principle will not work in the claimant’s favour. This is 
illustrated by the House of Lords’ decision in Wilsher v Essex AHA.96 In Wilsher, the baby’s 
RLF (retrolental fibroplasia) could have arisen from any of at least five separate and distinct 
factors. The defendant’s breach (excess oxygenation) was responsible for only one of these. It 
was impossible to assert that the breach was the sole cause of the RLF. It was equally 
untenable to argue that the breach materially contributed to it. It may have had no effect 
whatsoever. The House of Lords held that to show that the defendant’s negligence materially 
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increased the risk of the claimant’s injury did nothing to exclude the other causes; therefore, 
it was impossible for the court to infer that the defendant was the cause of the injuries.97 
(vii)  Reinstating McGhee: Fairchild 
In the landmark decision of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,98 their Lordships 
refuted the narrow construction of McGhee which had been placed upon it by the House of 
Lords in Wilsher.99 It was, therefore, not to be seen as an application of the traditional ‘but 
for’ test, rather as a departure from it in exceptional (and specific) circumstances. The 
claimants were exposed to asbestos dust over a long period of time whilst working for 
successive employers. They developed mesothelioma, a cancer of the lung. Claims were 
brought against some—but not all—of the employers. The evidence was that mesothelioma 
was caused by exposure to asbestos dust but it was not known whether it was caused by a 
single fibre or whether multiple fibres were necessary or made development of the cancer 
more likely. On the evidence, it could not be said which employer’s breach of duty in 
exposing the claimants to asbestos dust had caused, or materially contributed to, their 
injuries. There was a ‘scientific deficit’ in the evidence. The House of Lords unanimously 
held that each of the employers was liable to the claimant for their injuries.100 The Law Lords 
held, on policy grounds, that the McGhee test of ‘material increase in risk’ applied to fix each 
employer with responsibility for the claimants’ injuries. Where successive employers had 
failed to protect an employee from a disease (mesothelioma), but it could not be proved on a 
balance of probability which employer had caused the injury, the conduct of each employer 
in exposing the claimant to a material increase in risk to which the claimant should not have 
been exposed was to be treated as if it had made a material contribution to the disease. 101It 
was just to depart from the ‘but for’ test of causation where, as in this case, the injustice of 
holding an employer responsible for injury that he may not have caused (or contributed to) 
was outweighed by the injustice of leaving the employees without compensation.102 
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(viii) The scope of Fairchild and Clinical Negligence Cases 
The extent to which the Fairchild principle operates has been subject to judicial discussion in 
the Court of Appeal. While it has been observed that ‘great caution is required before any 
development of the Fairchild exception should be allowed’,103 it is clear that the conditions 
required to be satisfied for its application were not intended to exclude its application to other 
conditions and circumstances, and the exception will not be limited to cases of 
mesothelioma.104 In Sanderson v Hull,105 Smith LJ attempted to formalise the principles from 
Fairchild by adopting106 Lord Rodger’s conditions107 for its application. As expressed by 
Smith LJ, there were five main elements to the Fairchild principle operating to relax the need 
to satisfy the ‘but for’ test of causation. First, the claimant must show the current state of 
scientific knowledge leaves it inherently impossible for the claimant to prove exactly how his 
injury was caused. Secondly, the defendant’s breach of duty must have materially increased 
the risk of injury to the claimant.108 Thirdly, the defendant’s conduct must have been capable 
of causing the claimant’s injury. Fourthly, the claimant must show that the injury was caused 
by the eventuation of the kind of risk created by the defendant’s wrongdoing. Fifthly, the 
injury must be caused by the same agency as was involved in the defendant’s wrongdoing (or 
an agency which operates in a similar way).109 It is clear that Lord Rodger’s conditions in 
Fairchild are at a higher level of generality than those of Lord Bingham and Hoffmann,110 but 
in their principled approach they arguably provide the clearest guidance to practitioners and 
litigants as to Fairchild’s scope.  
 Since an essential element of the development of Fairchild will be the first element, 
namely the inherent impossibility for the claimant to prove enough to satisfy the ‘but for’ test, 
111 the likelihood is, however, that the Fairchild test will have little impact in medical 
negligence cases. In cases where there is a ‘scientific deficit’ in the evidence, it is unlikely 
that the factual context will work in a claimant’s favour. Usually, the claimant will be unable 
to show that the injury suffered was precisely that which flowed from the doctor (or other’s) 
breach of duty but rather that it was the result of one of a number of possible causative events 
each (or some) of which lacks the same essential characteristics of the risk created by the 
doctor- as in Wilsher itself- and the Law Lords cast no doubt on the actual outcome in 
Wilsher.112 Second, and perhaps more significantly, attempting to apply McGhee in the 
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medical context may not invoke the same policy response from the judges because of the 
impact that extending liability would have on the NHS and its budget.113 The remarks of Lord 
Hoffmann in Fairchild suggest that the McGhee/Fairchild approach is unlikely to be 
imported:114 
It is true that actions for clinical negligence notoriously give rise to difficult questions 
of causation. But it cannot possibly be that the duty to take care in treating patients 
would be virtually drained of content unless the creation of a material risk of injury 
were accepted as sufficient to satisfy the causal requirements of liability. And the 
political and economic arguments involved in the massive increase in liability of the 
National Health Service which would have been a consequence of the broad rule 
favoured by the Court of Appeal in Wilsher’s case are far more complicated than the 
reasons given [in McGhee] for imposing liability upon an employer who has failed to 
take simple precautions. 
(ix) Loss of a chance 
Following the decision of the House of Lords in Fairchild to take a flexible approach towards 
the problems of causation on policy grounds, the question of whether a loss of a chance, in 
the sense of a diminution of life expectancy by reference to worsened statistical chances of 
survival, should be recognized as damage giving rise to a claim in negligence was addressed 
by the House of Lords in Gregg v Scott.115 The claimant’s GP negligently failed to diagnose 
that he suffered from non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The cancer was subsequently diagnosed. 
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The expert evidence was that the negligent delay in diagnosing the condition reduced the 
claimant’s chance of survival for a five-year period from 42 per cent to 25 per cent. Could he 
recover damages in these circumstances? Following Hotson v East Berkshire AHA,116 the trial 
judge held that the claimant had failed to prove that the delay had made any difference to the 
outcome for him. As a result, he had failed to prove that the negligence caused or materially 
contributed to any injury. 
 The Court of Appeal (by a majority)117 rejected the claimant’s action for the “lost 
chance” of recovery from cancer. By a majority of 3:2, the House of Lords dismissed the 
claimant’s appeal.118 Two arguments were presented by the claimant. The first, the 
“quantification argument”, was that the delay had caused him physical injury in the form of 
enlargement of the tumour, because the trial judge had found that if he had been treated 
earlier, the cancer would not have spread as quickly as it did. He was entitled to 
compensation for this injury, including damages for the reduction in the chance of his 
survival. The second, the “loss of a chance argument”, was that the reduction in his chance of 
survival was itself a recoverable head of damage. 
 
 A majority of their Lordships rejected the first argument of the claimant, viz, the so-
called “quantification argument”. Lord Hoffmann said that the issue to be addressed was 
whether the claimant’s likely premature death would be attributable to the defendant’s delay 
in treatment.119 He concluded that the claimant was unable to show on a balance of 
probabilities that the delay in treatment would have caused his likely premature death, since 
he would probably have been in the same position of his life being shortened to less than ten 
years in any event.120 Lord Hope dissented from this view of the facts. He considered that on 
a balance of probabilities, the delay in treatment had caused the spread of the tumour with 
consequent pain and suffering, and that this gave him a cause of action for the pain and 
suffering caused by that injury and for the effect of the cancer on his life expectancy.121  
 
A majority of their Lordships also dismissed the claimant’s ‘loss of a chance 
argument’ that the defendant’s negligence in failing to diagnose the cancer tumour had 
reduced the claimant’s chance of survival from 42 per cent to 25 per cent and that this was 
something of value and recoverable on policy grounds. However, the effect of their ruling on 
whether loss of a chance of a favourable outcome could ever be a recoverable head of 
damage in a clinical negligence case remains inconclusive. Lord Hoffmann said that the 
claimant was attempting to extend the Fairchild exception so that damages should be 
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awarded for the possibility that the injury had been caused by the doctor.122 In his view the 
outcome of the claimant’s disease was determinate in that the cancer would inevitably reduce 
his life. The outcome was not random, but was governed “by the laws of causality” and an 
inability to establish that the delay in diagnosis caused the reduction in expectation of life 
could not be remedied “by treating the outcome as having been somewhat indeterminate”.123 
He expressly rejected the adoption of the loss of a chance approach in clinical negligence 
cases, concluding that adopting such a rule would be a rejection of Wilsher, Hotson and the 
qualifications and restrictions with which their Lordships hedged the Fairchild exception. No 
new arguments or change of circumstances could justify “such a radical departure from 
precedent”124 which would “amount to a legislative act”125 that would have “enormous 
consequences for insurance companies and the National Health Service”.126 Baroness Hale 
also rejected the loss of a chance approach. In her view, redefining the definition of personal 
injury from being in outcome terms to one being in loss of opportunity terms “would cause 
far more problems in the general run of personal injury claims than the policy benefits are 
worth”.127  
However, Lord Nicholls and Lord Hope were in favour of a claim succeeding on a 
loss of a chance basis in a clinical negligence action in a restricted set of circumstances. Lord 
Nicholls was willing to accept a claim for loss of a chance in cases where the patient’s 
condition “gave rise to significant medical uncertainty” as to what the outcome would have 
been in the absence of negligence.128 He distinguished Hotson, where there was no significant 
uncertainty as to what would have happened to Hotson’s leg if treated properly, from Gregg, 
where there was “considerable medical uncertainty about what the outcome would have been 
had Mr Gregg received appropriate treatment nine months earlier”.129 In his view, Mr 
Gregg’s prospects of recovery had he been treated promptly, expressed in percentage terms of 
likelihood, represented the medical reality of his position. The law, he said, “should be 
exceedingly slow to disregard medical reality in the context of a legal duty whose very aim is 
to protect medical reality”.130  
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Lord Hope also distinguished Gregg from Hotson. In Hotson, the “fundamental 
question of fact to be answered [viz, whether the boy’s fall was the cause of his avascular 
necrosis] related to a point in time before the negligent failure to treat began”.131 
Accordingly, it was to be treated “as a matter of past fact”. 132 By contrast, the injury which 
affected the claimant’s prospects of a successful recovery, namely the enlargement of the 
tumour, still lay in the future at the time when the claimant was seen by the doctor.133 While 
Lord Phillips upheld the decision of the trial judge on the facts, he left open the possibility of 
a claim for loss of a chance. On the facts, the case’s complications persuaded him that it was 
“not a suitable vehicle” to award damages for the reduction of the prospects of a cure, when 
the long term result of treatment was still uncertain.134 However, he did not rule out the 
possibility of a claim for loss of a chance where the medical treatment resulted in an adverse 
outcome and negligence increased the chance of that outcome, recovery of damages being 
proportionate to the increase in chance of the adverse outcome.135 
It therefore seems arguable136 that a claim for loss of a chance of a better medical outcome 
could be made where the patient’s condition gives rise to “significant medical uncertainty” as 
to what the outcome would have been in the absence of negligence,137 and ‘where medical 
treatment has resulted in an adverse outcome and negligence increased the chance of that 
outcome’.138 In Barker v Corus UK Ltd,139 Lord Hoffmann said that the majority of their 
Lordships in Gregg rejected the claimant’s case, not on the ground that there was some 
conceptual objection to treating diminution in the chances of a favourable outcome as 
actionable damage, but on the basis that adopting such a rule in Gregg “would in effect have 
extended the Fairchild exception to all cases of medical negligence, if not beyond, and would 
have been inconsistent with Wilsher.”140 This distinguishing of Gregg enabled Lord 
Hoffmann to characterize the gist of the damage in the Fairchild-type case as the creation of 
the risk or chance of causing the disease, without the possibility of inconsistency between the 
decisions.141 However, it has been argued that Lord Hoffmann’s formulation in Barker 
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“renders precarious the authority of Hotson”.142 Accordingly, the position in English law after 
Hotson and Gregg remains unresolved. 
 
7. Reforming the Costs of Civil Litigation in England and Wales: Implications of the 
Jackson Report for the Costs of Clinical Negligence and the Ministry of Justice Reform 
of Legal Aid  
 (a) Jackson Report 
Arguably the most comprehensive review of civil litigation costs since the Woolf Report, the 
Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs143 contains several recommendations which will, 
when implemented, have profound implications for the costs of clinical negligence cases.  
The Jackson Report notes that Conditional Fee Agreements (CFAs), of which “no win 
no fee” agreements are the most common, have been the “major contributor to 
disproportionate costs in civil litigation in England and Wales”.144 As we have previously 
seen, in their Report and Annual Accounts of 2010, the NHSLA  agree with Sir Rupert 
Jackson and are convinced that a major reason for the growth in volume of clinical 
negligence claims is the availability of this “ ‘so-called’ no win no fee market”.145 
The two key drivers of cost under these CFAs are (i) the lawyer’s success fee and (ii) 
the after-the-event (ATE) insurance premium that is usually taken out when a CFA is entered 
into (to cover the claimant against the risk of having to pay the defendant’s costs). Both the 
success fee and the ATE insurance premium are currently recoverable from an unsuccessful 
defendant.146 The Jackson Report noted that a significant part of the costs being paid by the 
NHSLA to claimant solicitors relates to these two drivers of cost, viz. success fees and ATE 
insurance premiums.147 
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Sir Rupert has made two controversial recommendations which would dramatically 
affect costs in clinical negligence cases. First, he has recommended that success fees and the 
ATE insurance premiums should cease to be recoverable from unsuccessful opponents in 
civil litigation. This, he believes, would lead to significant cost savings, whilst still enabling 
those who need access to justice to obtain it. It will be open to clients to enter into “no win, 
no fee” type agreements with their lawyers, but any success fee will be borne by the client, 
not the opponent. This is likely to mean that the success fee comes out of the damages 
awarded to the client.148 Jackson has noted, with approval,149 that success fees and ATE 
insurance premiums are not recoverable in Scotland, where the equivalent speculative fee 
agreement system works satisfactorily.150 Secondly, he has recommended what he has termed 
“Qualified one way costs shifting”.151  This means that, “the claimant will not be required to 
pay the defendant’s costs if the claim is unsuccessful, but the defendant will be required to 
pay the claimant’s costs if it is successful”.152 It is “qualified” in that unreasonable (or 
otherwise unjustified) party behaviour may lead to a different costs order, and the financial 
resources available to the parties may justify two-way costs shifting in certain cases.153 The 
justification for qualified one way costs shifting in the context of clinical negligence is that it 
would no longer require claimants to take out ATE insurance. It would also benefit 
defendants, as paying their own costs win or lose would be substantially cheaper than running 
the risk of paying the ATE insurance premium in those cases where they lose.154  
In its consultation paper on Implementation of the Jackson Report, the Ministry of Justice 
have supported these reforms. They have recommended that the success fee and the ATE 
insurance premium should no longer be recoverable from the losing party in all categories of 
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cases funded under CFAs, but that, in order to protect those who merit protection against 
adverse costs, qualified one way costs shifting should be introduced.155 
 
Sir Rupert also recommended that both solicitors and barristers should be permitted to 
enter into contingency fee agreements with their clients (which are known as “damages-based 
agreements” (DBAs))156 in contentious cases. These DBAs are a type of “no win no fee” 
arrangement like CFAs, since the legal representative is only paid if the case is successful and 
does not receive any payment if the case is lost. DBAs are distinguishable from CFAs in that 
the payment received by the legal representative is calculated by reference to the damages 
awarded to the client, as opposed to an uplift on the representative’s base costs. Accordingly, 
DBAs permit representatives to claim a proportion of their clients’ award of damages as their 
fee.157  However, Sir Rupert recommended that costs should be recoverable against opposing 
parties on a conventional hourly rates basis, and not by reference to a contingency fee. He 
also recommended that contingency fees must be regulated and should not be valid unless the 
client has received independent advice.158 The introduction of DBAs has been supported by 
the Ministry of Justice.159 There is no doubt that they could be utilised in clinical negligence 
cases, in that it would be these cases where legal representatives would be keen to claim a 
proportion of their client’s award of damages as their fee. However, a legitimate concern 
would be that there would be no incentive to take on borderline cases in the clinical 
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negligence field, reducing access to justice in many complex cases where proof of negligence 
and/or causation may be extremely difficult to establish.  
 
 
 
(b) Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales 
The UK Government has seen the CFA, shorn of the lawyer’s success fee and the ATE, but 
with the protection of qualified one way costs shifting, as the way to fund clinical negligence 
cases. At present, clinical negligence cases against the NHS are funded approximately 50:50 
between legal aid and CFAs (the latter in the form of no win, no fee agreements).160 
However, in the face of a reduction of 23% in its overall budget, in November 2010 
the Ministry of Justice proposed “fundamental reform” of the legal aid scheme.161 It 
considered that legal aid funding was not justified for clinical negligence cases, since there 
was a viable form of alternative, in the form of CFAs, which were likely to be more readily 
available in these cases than in other claims. The government therefore proposed to exclude 
civil legal aid from all clinical negligence cases.162   While recognising that there were likely 
to be cases such as obstetrics, with high disbursement costs, which were currently funded by 
legal aid, but for which clients might find it hard to secure funding under a CFA, they did not 
consider that this represented a sufficiently high proportion of cases to justify retaining 
clinical negligence within the scope of legal aid.163  On 21 June 2011, the Secretary of State 
for Justice confirmed this position in his introduction of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Bill, 164 stating that with 80% of clinical negligence cases being 
undertaken on a no win no fee basis, and only 20% using legal aid, a no win no fee basis of 
funding was ‘probably the better way forward’165.  It is submitted that it is likely that there 
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will be several losers in access to justice for clinical negligence if this approach is adopted. 
This is particularly a concern in cases assessed as having a 50:50 chance of success. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has examined medical liability in the UK, primarily from the perspective of 
clinical negligence in the NHS. We have seen that several reports have pointed to failure in 
the civil justice system in respect of clinical negligence claims. However, 14 years on from 
the Woolf report, medical negligence claims are subject to the same difficulties as they were 
then. A major problem, as we have seen, is that these claims are complex.  It is difficult to 
establish a breach of duty of care in clinical negligence cases, and even if that hurdle is 
overcome, there is the perennial problem of establishing causation.  
What is clear from the empirical data of the NHLSA’s Annual Report and Accounts is 
a trend of increasing costs of funding claims. However, in respect of their concern over  
increase in claim numbers, it is submitted that, when viewed in the context of the previous 
three years of relative stability, it is premature to suggest that such an increase in claim 
numbers during the last two years should give rise to the degree of concern that appears to 
have emanated from the NHSLA.  Indeed, it is clear that there has been a marked increase in 
access to justice over the last ten years in this area and this is to be welcomed. Nonetheless, 
there is something to be said for the view that the benefits have mostly gone to savvy 
claimant lawyers operating under no win no fee arrangements, especially in respect of low 
value claims.  
The UK Government sees the CFA, shorn of the lawyer’s success fee and the ATE, 
but with the protection of qualified one way costs shifting, as the way to fund clinical 
negligence cases.  It considers that legal aid funding is not justified for clinical negligence 
cases, since there is a viable form of alternative, in the form of CFAs, which are likely to be 
more readily available in these cases than in other claims. It has been submitted that there 
will be several losers in access to justice for clinical negligence when the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill is enacted, especially in cases assessed as 
having a 50:50 chance of success.  
While the proposed changes to legal aid in England and Wales are a source of 
concern, these changes do not apply to Scotland.166 The McLean report’s recommendations 
that consideration should be given to the establishment of a no fault compensation scheme for 
medical injury along the lines of the Swedish model and that such a scheme cover all medical 
treatment injuries that occur in Scotland, are radical developments in the field of 
compensation for medical malpractice. The Scottish Government has welcomed its proposals, 
but the devil will remain in the detail of how such a scheme would work in practice, with its 
associated cost implications. Moreover, while the proposed new system would remove the 
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need to prove negligence, it would still require proof that harm was caused by treatment. The 
thorny issue of causation is therefore not eliminated by the proposed scheme. 
 
 
